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There’s No Need to Rethink Desert: A Reply to Pummer 
 
1. Introduction 
Pummer (2014) ingeniously wraps together issues from the personal identity 
literature with issues from the literature on desert. However, I wish to take issue 
with the main conclusion that he draws, namely, that we need to rethink the 
following principle: 
Desert. When people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they deserve 
punishment in the following sense: at least other things being equal they 
ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue of the fact that they culpably 
did wrong—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing 
them would benefit no one. (Pummer, 2014: 43-44) 
Pummer offers an argument that is intended to show that this principle, along with 
widely-held views about personal identity, entails an inconsistent triad of 
propositions. I agree. But I think Pummer’s argument attacks a straw man. I 
believe that no-one holds Desert, at least as it is stated, and that once the principle 
is stated correctly it is easy to see that no inconsistent triad follows from it. So, 
Desert does not need rethinking. It just needs to be stated correctly. 
 Pummer’s argument is somewhat involved, and takes many twists and 
turns. So in section 2 I present Pummer’s argument in four stages by outlining just 
those parts of it that are needed to reach his main conclusion. In section 3 I 
reformulate Desert as Desert* and rerun the four stages of the argument. I will 
show that the argument falters at the third stage, and that as a consequence it fails 
at the fourth stage. I discuss and consider objections to my argument in section 4. 
I briefly conclude in section 5. 
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2. Pummer’s Argument in Four Stages 
 
First stage. Pummer asks us to consider cases of fission and fusion familiar from 
the personal identity literature, but with the added twist that (some of) the 
persons involved have culpably committed acts for which they deserve 
punishment. He first asks us to consider a case in which a person (we shall call her 
A) has culpably committed murder, but who undergoes fission such that two 
persons result (we shall call them B and C). Pummer argues that if we suppose that 
A deserves X amount of punishment, then B and C deserve X amount of 
punishment each (and so the total amount of punishment deserved increases from 
X to 2X). This is so, Pummer argues, whether or not we think that either B or C is 
identical with A. This is because, in the absence of C, B would have been identical 
with A, and so would herself deserve X amount of punishment (mutatis mutandis 
for C). So the mere existence of C might make a difference to whether B is identical 
with A, but this is only due to a ‘technicality involving the logic of identity’, and so 
it is implausible that the mere existence of C can make a difference to how much 
punishment B deserves (mutatis mutandis for C). (Pummer, 2013: 52)1 It is 
obvious that this case generalises. No matter how many times A fissions, each of 
                                                 
1 Pummer is clear that this argument fails for a limited number of views about personal identity, e.g. the 
Simple view according to which there is a (brute) fact in cases of fission about which of the resultant 
persons is identical with the original. But Pummer assumes for the sake of argument that any such view 
is false. (Pummer, 2014: 46)  At any rate, his argument should be endorsed by anyone who holds one 
of a wide variety of views on personal identity, including the views advanced by Shoemaker (1984), 
Parfit (1984), Lewis (1976) and Olson (1997). So Pummer’s argument has a wide scope. 
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the resultant persons will deserve however much punishment A deserves. 
Pummer thus endorses: 
Division Multiplies Desert. When a person who deserves punishment 
undergoes division, each product of division deserves the same amount of 
punishment this person deserves. (Pummer, 2014: 50) 
 
Second stage. Pummer asks us to consider a case of fusion in which two 
qualitatively identical persons (we shall call them D and E) have each committed 
an independent culpable act (suppose again it is murder) but who then undergo 
fusion such that a single person results (we shall call her F). He argues that if we 
suppose that D and E each deserve X amount of punishment, then F deserves X 
amount of punishment (and so the total amount of punishment deserved 
decreases from 2X to X). This is so, Pummer argues, whether or not we think that 
F is identical with either D or E. This is because ‘punishing a fusion product [in this 
case, F] is, from the point of view of Desert, tantamount to punishing each of the 
fusion ingredients [in this case, D and E] in the same way and to the same extent’, 
and so there is ‘just as much desert-based reason to make the fusion product of 
[D] and [E] worse off to degree X (as there is to make [D] and [E] each worse off to 
degree X)’. (Pummer, 2014: 60-61) Again, it is obvious that this case generalises. 
No matter how many fusion ingredients we start with, the resultant fusion product 
will deserve however much punishment each of the fusion ingredients deserve. 
Pummer thus endorses: 
Fusion Divides Desert. If n people who each deserve m years of 
punishment fuse, the fusion product deserves m years of punishment. The 
total prefusion punishment deserved is m times n years, and the total 
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postfusion punishment deserved is m times n years divided by n—or just 
m years. (Pummer, 2014: 62) 
 
Third stage. Pummer asks us to consider ordinary (by fission and fusion 
standards) cases of punishment in which n persons deserve X amount of 
punishment and one person deserves Y<X amount of punishment, but such that 
we can, for some reason, only give each of the persons exactly the same amount of 
punishment. When comparing some cases, he argues, there is some number n such 
that the amount of punishment we should give to each person is higher than it 
would be were n equal to 1. He gives one such comparison in which he thinks this 
is true. In a case in which one single person deserves twenty years of punishment 
and another single person fifteen, he thinks, we should give each a lesser sentence 
to each person than in a case in which one-million persons each deserve twenty 
years of punishment, and another single person fifteen years of punishment. For 
the sake of argument, I allow that Pummer is right about this. He then argues that 
this conclusion carries across to cases of tragic fusion, i.e. those in which persons 
deserving of X amount of punishment fuse with persons deserving Y<X amount of 
punishment. He thus endorses: 
Numbers Matter FUSION. There is some finite number n such that P2 [the 
fusion product of n persons deserving twenty years punishment and one 
deserving fifteen] deserves more punishment than P1 [the fusion product 
of one person deserving twenty years of punishment and one deserving 
fifteen] . (Pummer, 2014: 69) 
In addition, he assumes that n is sufficiently large if it is at least one-million. 
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Fourth stage. Pummer asks us to consider two cases of tragic fusion. The first, 
Ordinary Fusion, is a simple case in which a single person deserving twenty years 
of punishment fuses with a single person deserving fifteen. The second, First 
Angela Divides, is a more complicated case in which a single person deserving 
twenty years of punishment first undergoes fission such that one-million persons 
result, and subsequently the one-million resultant persons fuse with a single 
person who deserves fifteen years of punishment. He gives the following diagram 
to illustrate the two cases: 
 
 
Pummer’s contention is that Carol and Dorothy deserve the same amount of 
punishment. Again, for the sake of argument, I agree. But this, Pummer argues, 
cannot be maintained if Division Multiplies Desert and Numbers Matter FUSION are 
true. Division Multiplies Desert entails that each of the one-million persons that 
result from Angela’s fission in First Angela Divides deserve twenty years of 
punishment each. Then Numbers Matter FUSION entails that Dorothy deserves more 
punishment than Carol. Thus, finally we obtain: 
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Fusion Problem. We must deny either 
(i) Dorothy deserves no more punishment than Carol; or, 
(ii) Numbers Matter FUSION; or, 
(iii) Division Multiplies Desert (Pummer, 2014: 72) 
 
3. Rerunning Pummer’s Argument with Desert*  
To see the flaw in Pummer’s argument we need to return to the beginning and 
consider his statement of Desert: 
 Desert. When people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they deserve 
punishment in the following sense: at least other things being equal they 
ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue of the fact that they culpably 
did wrong—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing 
them would benefit no one. (Pummer, 2014: 43-44) 
The problem with this statement of Desert is that it does not adequately 
distinguish between what are known as the ingredients of desert. On the standard 
view of desert any particular case involves at least three ingredients: a basis, a 
subject, and an object. The subject is simply the person who deserves punishment, 
the object is the punishment they deserve, and the basis is the thing they deserve 
to be punished for.2 It is the latter of these ingredients that will be of importance 
in what follows. 
                                                 
2 See McLeod (2013) for an excellent overview of the literature on desert. McLeod’s review contains 
references to seventy-two philosophers nearly all of who explicitly endorse the view that desert has at 
least these three ingredients. 
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Often, when we claim that a person deserves punishment, the basis upon 
which they deserve it can remain unspecified, because it is obviously determined 
by particular contextual factors. For example, if I see Suzy commit a murder and 
claim immediately afterwards that she deserves to be sent to prison, it is obvious 
that it is on the basis of the murder that I make my claim. And if I claim at my local 
abstinence meeting that some well-known philanderer deserves a harsh 
punishment, it is obvious that it is on the basis of their well-known philandering 
that I make my claim. 
In other cases the basis upon which one makes a claim of desert is not 
obvious, and needs stating. This is especially important in cases in which there are 
a number of potential bases upon which one is making one’s claim. For example, 
consider a case in which there is some person about which it is known that he 
either committed punishable act α, or punishable act β, but it is not known which. 
Suppose further that act α is worse than act β and so is such that most would 
consider a harsher punishment to be appropriate for committing α than β. If I claim 
that this person deserves a particular punishment, it would be proper to ask me 
upon which of these acts I base my claim. Furthermore, in cases where a person 
performs more than one punishable act, one can differentiate between those acts 
and claim that the person in question deserves separate punishments for each. So, 
for example, I might claim that Suzy deserves to go to prison for twenty years on 
the basis of the murder she committed, and deserves to go to prison for a further 
six years on the basis of the robbery she committed the day before. As we will see, 
in fission-fusion cases it will be important to keep track of the bases of desert, so 
in order to do so, we should formulate Desert explicitly in terms of such bases as: 
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Desert*. When people culpably perform a very wrong or bad act α, they 
deserve to be punished on the basis of α in the following sense: at least 
other things being equal they ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue 
of the fact that they culpably performed α—even if they have repented, are 
now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. 
To see why it is important that we formulate the principle in this way when 
considering cases of fission and fusion we need to trace the effect of so formulating 
it through the various stages of Pummer’s argument. 
 
First stage. At this stage the effect of Desert* is minimal. Person A culpably 
commits an action α before undergoing fission such that persons B and C result. A 
deserves X amount of punishment on the basis of α. B and C, as continuers of A, 
each deserve X amount of punishment on the basis of α. Each is appropriately 
connected to the punishable act α, and so each should be punished by amount X 
on its basis. The case generalises so we ought to endorse: 
Division Multiplies Desert*. When a person who deserves punishment on 
the basis of an act α undergoes division, each product of division deserves 
the same amount of punishment on the basis of α as this person deserves. 
 
Second stage.  At the second stage the effect of Desert* is more palpable, but still 
makes little difference. Person D has committed act α and deserves X amount of 
punishment on the basis of α. Person E has committed act β and deserves X amount 
of punishment on the basis of β.  D and E undergo fusion such that a single person 
F results. Person F, as a continuer of both D and E, deserves at least some amount 
of punishment on the basis of α and some amount of punishment on the basis of β. 
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But punishing F by giving her X amount of punishment is tantamount to punishing 
each of D and E in the same way and to the same extent, and so F should be given 
X amount of punishment on the basis of α and β. This case generalises, so we 
should endorse: 
Fusion Divides Desert*. If persons p1, p2,… pn who each deserve m years 
of punishment for respective actions α1, α2,… αn fuse, the fusion product 
deserves m years of punishment on the basis of α1, α2,… αn. 
 
Third stage. Here the effect of Desert* becomes significant. We are to consider 
cases of punishment in which persons p1, p2,…pn deserve X amount of punishment 
on the basis of performing respective individual punishable acts α1, α2… αn, and 
one person p0 deserves Y<X amount of punishment on the basis of a punishable 
act β. We can, for some reason, only give each of the persons exactly the same 
amount of punishment. In some comparisons of such cases, I have allowed, there 
is some number n such that the amount of punishment we should give to each 
person is higher than it would be were n equal to 1. Nothing changes here with the 
introduction of Desert*. In a case in which one single person deserves twenty 
years of punishment on the basis of an act α and another single person fifteen 
years on the basis of an act β, we should give each a lesser sentence than in a case 
in which persons p1, p2,… p1000000 each deserve twenty years of punishment on 
the basis of one-million respective individual punishable acts α1, α2,… α1000000, 
and another single person p0 fifteen years on the basis of a punishable act β. But it 
is at this stage that Pummer’s argument falters. With Desert* in play rather than 
Desert, it is implausible that the conclusion here carries across to all cases of tragic 
fusion. 
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It is plausible that the conclusion carries across to some cases of tragic 
fusion. Our base case is a case in which one single person who deserves twenty 
years of punishment on the basis of an act α fuses with another single person who 
deserves fifteen years on the basis of an act β. Call the resultant person in this case 
G. Now consider a case (that we shall call ‘Multi Fusion’) in which one-million 
persons p1, p2,… p1000000, who each deserve twenty years of punishment on the 
basis of one-million respective individual punishable acts α1, α2,… α1000000, fuse 
with another person p0 who deserves fifteen years on the basis of a punishable act 
β. It is plausible that we should give a harsher sentence than we give to G to the 
person who results in Multi Fusion. But is not plausible that we should give a 
harsher sentence than we give to G to the person who results in a case like First 
Angela Divides in which one-million persons p1, p2,… p1000000, who each deserve 
twenty years of punishment on the basis of a single punishable act α, fuse with 
another person p0 who deserves fifteen years punishment on the basis of a 
punishable act β. In the base case G is due punishment on the basis of two distinct 
punishable acts (i.e. α and β). In Multi Fusion when p1,p2…p1000000 fuse with p0 
the punishment is due to the resultant person on the basis of one-million-and-one 
distinct punishable acts (i.e. α1, α2,… α1000000 and β) and so it is plausible that 
we give this person a harsher punishment than we give G in the base case. But in 
cases like First Angela Divides when p1, p2… p1000000 fuse with p0 the 
punishment is, like in the base case, due on the basis of only two distinct 
punishable acts (i.e. α and β). We thus have a perfectly good reason to treat the 
second case as we treat the base case, and give the resultant person in each the 
same amount of punishment. So, we have a perfectly good reason to modify 
Numbers Matter FUSION to exclude cases like the second case here, i.e. as follows: 
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Numbers Matter FUSION*. There is some finite number n such that P2 [the 
fusion product of n persons deserving twenty years punishment and one 
deserving fifteen] deserves more punishment than P1 [the fusion product 
of one person deserving twenty years of punishment and one deserving 
fifteen], except in cases in which the punishment is due to P2 on the basis of 
only two punishable acts, and in such cases P2 deserves the same amount of 
punishment as P1. 
 
Fourth stage. It can now easily be seen that the fourth stage of Pummer’s argument 
fails. No inconsistent triad of propositions can be generated simply because 
Division Multiplies Desert* together with Numbers Matter FUSION* does not entail 
that Dorothy deserves more punishment that Carol. Angela, in First Angela 
Divides, deserves twenty years of punishment on the basis of a single act α. 
Consequently, by Division Multiplies Desert* when Angela undergoes fission each 
of the resultant one-million persons are punishable on the basis of that single act 
α. Barbara deserves fifteen years punishment on the basis of a single act β. So, 
when the one-million fuse with Barbara such that Dorothy results, Dorothy is 
punishable on the basis of only two punishable acts, viz. α and β. As Carol in 
Ordinary fusion is also punishable on the basis of only two distinct punishable 
acts, Numbers Matter FUSION* entails that they should receive the same amount of 
punishment as each other. 
 
4. Discussion3 
                                                 
3 Each of the objections discussed in this section are due to an anonymous referee, who I thank 
unreservedly for making me think harder about the dialectical situation that my argument gives rise to. 
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I have taken pains to distinguish Desert from Desert*. I have done so because 
Desert, unlike Desert*, fails to make it clear that people only deserve to be 
punished on the basis of the culpable acts they have committed (or, perhaps, are 
otherwise responsible for). My claim is that only Desert supports Numbers Matter 
FUSION, and so only Desert leads to the Fusion Problem. Desert*, by contrast, supports 
a restricted version of Numbers Matter FUSION (i.e. Numbers Matter FUSION*) from 
which the Fusion Problem does not arise. Have I done enough to show why the 
unrestricted version of Numbers Matter FUSION is false? I think I have, but a few 
further words of explanation are in order to make this clear. The concept of desert 
is a relational concept. One cannot deserve simpliciter a certain amount of 
punishment – one can only deserve a certain amount of punishment for a 
particular act or acts. In First Angela Divides each of Angela’s one million fission 
products deserves a certain amount of punishment for an act performed by Angela. 
When they fuse together with Barbara, the resultant fusion product (Dorothy) 
deserves a certain amount of punishment for an act performed by Angela, and a 
certain amount of punishment for an act performed by Barbara. So there is just a 
single person present, Dorothy, and there are two considerations which are 
relevant to what punishment she deserves. In a case in which one million and one 
persons p1, p2, p3, etc, each deserving certain amounts of punishment on the basis 
of one million and one separate acts fuse together there is again a single person 
present, but the considerations that are relevant to how much punishment this 
person deserves are far more numerous. The resultant fusion product deserves a 
certain amount of punishment for an act performed by p1, a certain amount of 
punishment for an act performed by p2, a certain amount of punishment for an act 
performed by p3, etc. Given that different considerations bear in the two cases, we 
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shouldn’t expect the punishment deserved in these two cases to be equal. 
Moreover, consider that in the case of Ordinary Fusion there is again a single 
person present (i.e. Carol, the fusion product of Angela and Barbara) who deserves 
a certain amount of punishment for an act performed by Angela, and a certain 
amount of punishment for an act performed by Barbara. These are exactly the 
same considerations that are relevant in First Angela Divides, and so we should 
expect the punishment deserved in these two cases to be equal. 
 I have argued that Numbers Matter FUSION is false, and that only a restricted 
version of the principle is true, on the basis that it does not take into account the 
bases of desert. But what cannot be denied is that Numbers Matter FUSION (i.e. in its 
unrestricted form) has at least a claim to intuitive support. Consider once more 
First Angela Divides and suppose that one confronts the situation pre-fusion (i.e. 
after Angela has undergone fission resulting in one million fission products, but 
before those fission products have fused with Barbara to produce Dorothy). 
Barbara, remember, deserves fifteen years of punishment on the basis of a single 
culpable act performed by her, and each of Angela’s fission products deserves 
twenty years of punishment on the basis of a single culpable act performed by 
Angela (this is implied by Division Multiplies Desert* as well as its unstarred 
counterpart). Compare this situation with Multi Fusion (i.e. the case in which a 
single person deserving of fifteen years of punishment on the basis of one culpable 
act fuses with one million persons each deserving of twenty years of punishment 
on the basis of one million culpable acts) and suppose one confronts this situation 
pre-fusion too. I claim that the correct thing to say here is this: when the fusions 
take place the resultant person in the first case (i.e. First Angela Divides) will 
deserve less punishment than the resultant person in the second case (i.e. Multi 
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Fusion). But isn’t this intuitively implausible, when considering the cases pre-
fusion like this? After all, considered at that time, the cases are exactly parallel, so 
shouldn’t the resultant persons receive the same amount of punishment after all? 
Why should it matter that in the first case the one million persons were previously 
co-located but in the second they were not? Isn’t it the case that the only thing that 
matters is how things stand now? If so, then Numbers Matter FUSION must be true 
after all. 
 I admit the force of the intuition that the only thing that matters when 
considering the cases pre-fusion is how things stand at that time, and I admit that 
if that intuition were a good one then it would offer strong support for Numbers 
Matter FUSION in its unrestricted form, which would mean that giving it up is a 
significant cost. However, I think there is a good reason for thinking the intuition 
is faulty. Our world is one in which fission and fusion do not occur, and so when 
we learn at a particular time that people in our world deserve a certain amount of 
punishment, they invariably deserve it on the basis of an action that they, and they 
alone, performed in the past. And so I think it is plausible that when we consider 
cases from a particular temporal perspective our intuitions are skewed – we have 
the intuition that all that matters is how things stand now, because in our world 
when considering cases of desert, invariably, all that does matter is how things 
stand now. In other words, I think the intuition is faulty precisely because it fails 
to take proper account of the past and so the bases of desert, but why we have 
such a faulty intuition has a natural explanation. 
 That the above contention is correct is bolstered, at least if my intuitions 
are anything to go by, by comparing the two cases atemporally, i.e. side-by-side in 
diagrammatic form: 
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The picture depicts the very same situation that we just now considered from a 
temporal perspective, yet it is certainly not clear to me when considering this 
picture that Dorothy and the resultant person in Multi Fusion deserve the same 
amount of punishment; the intuition has lost its strength. It seems to me that when 
we consider this case from the temporal perspective we lose sight of the 
importance that keeping track of the bases of desert has, and considering the 
diagram helps us in this respect. If this hypothesis is right, it should also hold in 
the comparison between First Angela Divides and Ordinary Fusion. And it does 
indeed seem to hold. 
Earlier we saw that a crucial part of Pummer’s argument is that Dorothy 
and Carol deserve the same amount of punishment. He establishes this by 
presenting First Angela Divides and Ordinary Fusion atemporally, side-by-side in 
diagrammatic form. In effect, he asks us to share his intuition that in the two cases, 
presented in such a manner, both of the resultant persons deserve the same 
amount of punishment. But now consider this situation from a temporal 
perspective, pre-fusion once more. Considered as such, First Angela Divides is one 
in which there are one million and one persons present, one million of whom 
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deserve twenty years of punishment and one of whom deserves fifteen, and 
ordinary Fusion is a case in which there are two persons present, one of whom 
deserves fifteen years of punishment and one of whom deserves twenty. What is 
the correct thing to say, from this particular temporal perspective? Pummer’s 
answer is: when the fusions take place the resultant person in First Angela Divides 
(i.e. Dorothy) will deserve the same amount of punishment as the resultant person 
in Ordinary Fusion (i.e. Carol). But here we can raise analogous questions to those 
we raised above when comparing First Angela Divides with Multi Fusion from a 
temporal perspective: Isn’t this intuitively implausible, when considering the 
cases pre-fusion like this? After all, considered at that time, the cases are not at all 
alike – in the first case there are one million persons who deserves twenty years 
of punishment, but in the second there is only one person, so shouldn’t the 
resultant person is the first case be given more punishment than the one in the 
second? Why should it matter that in the first case the one million persons were 
previously co-located but in the second they were not? Isn’t it the case that the 
only thing that matters is how things stand now? 
The intuitions that we have, then, when comparing cases from a temporal 
perspective conflict with those we have when considering them atemporally. In 
such cases at least one intuition must be faulty, and I have given reasons for 
thinking the fault is with the temporal intuitions. So replacing Numbers Matter 
FUSION with Numbers Matter FUSION* comes at the cost of giving up on an 
intuition that is plausibly faulty anyway, which is very little cost at all.4 
                                                 
4 Incidentally, Numbers Matter FUSION (which, remember, is (ii) of the Fusion Problem) implies both 
(1.) Dorothy deserves the same punishment as the resultant person in Multi Fusion, and (2.) Carol 
deserves less punishment than the resultant person in Multi Fusion. But (1.), (2.) and (i) of the Fusion 
Problem (i.e. Dorothy deserves the same punishment as Carol) are mutually inconsistent. So, no matter 
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There is one last matter that is worth considering. In the course of giving 
his argument Pummer also considers cases in which we must (for some reason) 
give an equal amount X of punishment to each member of a set in which one 
member deserves fifteen years of punishment and each of the other n members 
deserves twenty years each. He endorses the following principle (from which 
Numbers Matter FUSION is derived): 
 
Numbers Matter. There is some number n such that X should be greater 
than what X should be if instead n were 1. 
 
In rejecting Numbers Matter FUSION in favour of Numbers Matter FUSION* must I also 
reject Numbers Matter?5 One might think the answer is yes if we allow Numbers 
Matter to apply in every range of possible cases. Consider one such range, viz. 
those cases involving a person p0 who deserves fifteen years of punishment on the 
basis of a single act β and n other persons each of whom deserves twenty years of 
punishment on the basis of a single act α (First Angela Divides, pre-fusion, is such 
a case). In the actual world, where fission never occurs, n is always equal to 1. But 
if we consider cases in which a single person performs an act deserving of 20 years 
                                                 
what one says regarding (iii) of the Fusion Problem (i.e. Division Multiplies Desert), if one maintains 
Desert one must reject either (i) or (ii). 
5 Incidentally, I don’t think Numbers Matter actually has anything to do with Desert. I am inclined to say 
that in the cases that it applies to each person deserves exactly the same amount of punishment as they 
would deserve were we able to give them as much individual punishment as we wanted (so, no matter 
how large n is, each n still deserves twenty years of punishment). It is just that, in such cases, we have 
no way to give everyone the punishment they deserve. The issue here, then, seems to me to be one of 
fairness, i.e. the issue is how to punish each fairly given that each deserves a certain amount of 
punishment. Cases like First Angela Divides, by contrast, concern how much punishment we should give 
to a single person, and so do concern issues of desert. At any rate, I here concede for the sake of argument 
that Numbers Matter does concern Desert, i.e., I concede for the sake of argument that our intuitions 
about how much punishment we should give to each person are intuitions not about fairness but about 
how much punishment they deserve. 
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of punishment and then divides into n fission products, n can be arbitrarily large. 
I believe that in cases like this, if n is high enough, the amount of punishment we 
should give to each member of the set is greater than it should be if n=1 (i.e. in a 
case in which fission does not take place). But shouldn’t I deny this given that in 
this case too there are only two wrong acts (i.e. α and β) committed in the past? 
The answer is no. This case is entirely different from cases like First Angela 
Divides. In cases like First Angela Divides, post-fusion, there is only a single person 
present, and we must decide how much punishment she deserves (thus, the only 
relevant considerations are which acts she deserves punishment for). In the cases 
presently under consideration, by contrast, there are many persons present, and 
we must decide how much punishment each of them deserves based not only on 
the wrong acts they are responsible for, but also on the basis of the wrong acts that 
others are responsible for. And these are additional relevant considerations. In 
short, numbers really do matter, but the number that matters is the number of 
persons we are considering as being due punishment. In the cases under 
consideration that number can be arbitrarily high. But in cases like First Angela 
Divides, that number is always equal to 1. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In his conclusion Pummer states that he has given us some reason to rethink 
Desert. He says: 
A possible conclusion to draw is that the division and fusion cases I have 
discussed here reveal the fact that we simply ought to deny Desert. It is not 
clear that this is the right conclusion to draw, but it does seem to be a 
19 
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mistake to claim that it is easily avoided, or avoided at no cost. (Pummer, 
2014: 74) 
On the contrary. As I have shown, the conclusion can be avoided quite easily and, 
whilst perhaps not without any cost, at least with very little cost. One simply has 
to state Desert correctly and carefully follow through the consequences. Once one 
does so, it becomes apparent that there is a well-motivated restriction that should 
be made to Numbers Matter FUSION that blocks the disagreeable conclusion that 
Dorothy deserves more punishment that Carol. I thus conclude that Pummer gives 
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